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NOTE
SOMETHING WICKED THIS WAY COMES:
CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION AND
THE GROWING POWER OF THE SUPREME
COURT
Matthew B. Stein*
The people reign over the American political world as does God over
the universe. They are the cause and the end of all think's; everything
comes out of them and everything is absorbed into them.

INTRODUCTION
In 1936, amidst the devastation of the Depression, three million
people thronged the polling stations in New York State to cast their
votes in support of President Roosevelt and his New Deal.2 People
saw President Roosevelt's vision of the future as the saving grace of
the country-a country deeply wounded by severe economic
turmoil 3-and they desperately wanted four more years of President
Roosevelt's leadership.4 The New Deal began the transformation of
federal government that the People of America wanted, and they
came out in unprecedented numbers to express that support.5
Standing in the way of this revolutionary vision was a solid wall of
Supreme Court jurisprudence. 6 Over the previous thirty-five years,
the Court had overturned many legislative acts designed to alleviate
the ills of the working class on the basis of the Due Process and Equal
. J.D. Candidate, 2003, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Martin Flaherty, whose guidance and assistance was invaluable in getting
this Note off the ground. I also want to thank my friends for enabling me to keep all
things in perspective, and to Dad, Mom and Josh, sine qua non.
1. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 55 (Harvey C. Mansfield &
Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (1840).
2. Jerrold G. Rusk, A Statistical History of the American Electorate 189 (2001).
3. See FDR and the Supreme Court, FDR Press Conference (May 31, 1935),
available at http://newdeal.feri.org/court/fdr5 31_35.htm.
4. See Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court: The Structure of a
Constitutional Revolution 26 (1998) [hereinafter Cushman, Structure].
5. Id.
6. Elizabeth C. Price, ConstitutionalFidelity and the Commerce Clause: A Reply
to ProfessorAckerman, 48 Syracuse L. Rev. 139, 159 (1998).
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Protection Clauses.7 The Court emphasized the rights of property and
contract over any interference by the federal government, regardless
of the motivation behind that legislation.8 This stand placed the Court
increasingly at odds with President Roosevelt. With the election of
1936, it became apparent to the Court that being at odds with
President Roosevelt meant being at odds with the very people whose
rights it intended to protect. 9
With that realization, the Court took an about-face in terms of its
constitutional interpretation. ' The Court began supporting New Deal
legislation, allowing for the expansion of federal powers and
overturning many of its own prior decisions." In case after case, the
Court allowed the federal government to legislate, regulating the
national economy. Some suggest that this change occurred because
President Roosevelt threatened to "pack" the Court by expanding the
number of justices to fifteen, thereby ensuring the Court's support of
his legislation."2 This interpretation, however, ignores the fact that
Justice Roberts, for example, began to change his interpretation of the
Constitution before President Roosevelt's threat. 13
The more
accurate explanation is that the Court was responding to a mandate
from the People, that it understood that the time had come to change
its interpretation of the Constitution. 4
As Bruce Ackerman argues, the Court's well-known "switch in
time" was part of a larger series of events that forced the Court to
validate the New Deal. 5 Before 1937, the Court had rejected most of
President Roosevelt's proposals. However, a series of landslide
victories for President Roosevelt and the Democrats pushed the Court
to read the Commerce Clause more broadly, permitting the federal
government 6to take on a larger role in curing the woes of the Great
Depression.'
This validation of the New Deal is part of Ackerman's larger theory
that the "switch in time" and its aftermath deserve the same
7. Id. at 158.
8. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that legislation
regulating working hours violated the substantive due process right of liberty of
contract).
9. See 2 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations 310-11 (1998)
[hereinafter Ackerman, Transformations]; Robert H. Jackson, The Struggle for
Judicial Supremacy: A Study of a Crisis in American Power Politics 176-79 (1941).
10. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
11. Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 9, at 25-26.
12. David M. O'Brien, 1 Constitutional Law and Politics: Struggles for Power and
Governmental Accountability 947 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter O'Brien, Constitutional
Law].
13. Leonard Baker, Back to Back: The Duel Between FDR and the Supreme
Court 175-76 (1967).
14. Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 9, at 23-26.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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prominence as the Founding and the Reconstruction Amendments. 17
While no formal amendments accompanied the New Deal, it ushered
in a new era of constitutional politics, one which Ackerman argues
stemmed directly from a mandate from the People. 8 Along the same
line of argument, if a constitutional mandate from the People was
necessary to implement this interpretation, then another mandate
from the People must be necessary to alter it.
Likewise, a
constitutional change on this level without a mandate undermines the
very essence of American democracy and the founding principles of
our country.
Recently, the Court similarly has taken an about-face in its
constitutional interpretation, chipping away at the very principles that
have shaped our country since the New Deal. 9 Beginning with United
States v. Lopez," the Court has curtailed the powers of the federal
government under the Commerce Clause, relying on the concept of
dual sovereignty inherent in the Tenth Amendment.2 This change in
interpretation has altered the balance of power between the federal
and state governments.22 The question remains as to whether this
change is supported by any mandate from the People as existed during
the mid-1930s.
Part I of this Note explains the details of Ackerman's theory of
constitutional change and uses his analysis of the New Deal as an
illustration.23 The New Deal is particularly instructive in examining
the current situation because it is an example of major constitutional
change without amending the Constitution. 4 If the current situation

17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional
Revolution, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1045, 1052-58 (2001); Walter Dean Burnham,
Constitutional Moments and Punctuated Equilibria: A Political Scientist Confronts
Bruce Ackerman's We the People, 108 Yale L.J. 2237, 2273 (1999); Price, supra note 6,
at 220-21.
20. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
21. See id. at 552 (reviewing the emphasis Madison placed on reading the
Constitution as a delegation of power to the federal government); id. at 574-78
(Kennedy, J., concurring); Tinsley E. Yarbrough, The Rehnquist Court and the
Constitution 114 (2000); John F. Stack, Jr. & Colton C. Campbell, The Least
Dangerous Branch?: The Supreme Court's New Judicial Activism, in Congress
Confronts the Court: The Struggle for Legitimacy and Authority in Lawmaking 95,
102-04 (Colton C. Campbell & John F. Stasck, Jr. eds., 2001); see also Ralph A.
Rossum, Federalism, the Supreme Court, and the Seventeenth Amendment 249-50
(2001) (using reasoning similar to that of New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
156-57 (1992)). The Tenth Amendment states that "[t]he powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to
the states respectively, or to the people." U.S. Const. amend. X.
22. John T. Noonan, Jr., Narrowing the Nation's Power: The Supreme Court Sides
with the States 5 (2002).
23. See infra Part I.A.
24. See infra Part I.B.
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fits into the Ackerman model, it is another major constitutional
change that has occurred without a constitutional amendment.
Part II looks at current Supreme Court jurisprudence, illustrating
the alteration of the Commerce Clause doctrine.2 5 This part then
analyzes more recent events, focusing on polling data during the
Reagan and Gingrich years to determine if a popular mandate for
constitutional change existed as it did in 1936.26 The platforms of the
two politicians and their successes, as well as the popular support for
states' rights are also examined.
Part III contends that the new Commerce Clause cases represent a
fundamental change in constitutional interpretation.2 7 The part then
compares the polling data from the modern era to data from the mid1930s to determine whether this change in constitutional
interpretation is the product of another mandate from the People.2"
The inescapable conclusion is that minimal support exists for a major
change in constitutional jurisprudence.
I. WE THE PEOPLE: ACKERMAN AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
The foundation of our current governmental system rests on the
legitimacy of the New Deal and the Supreme Court opinions that
This part
eventually affirmed its legislative accomplishments.29
discusses Ackerman's theory of constitutional change and, more
importantly, how he uses it to explain the "switch in time" within the
Supreme Court in 1937, which legitimized the New Deal. The
purpose of Ackerman's analysis is to create a paradigm that functions
as the control, the standard by which everything else is judged.
Section A explains Ackerman's theory of constitutional
jurisprudential change. Section B elaborates on Ackerman's theory
by looking at his account of the New Deal, following his chronological
analysis. This analysis is significant because it explains how a major
change in constitutional interpretation can occur without an
amendment to the Constitution. Section C concludes this part by
summarizing the steps of Ackerman's analysis and emphasizing its
focus on the voice of the People.
A. How Much Higher Is Higher Lawmaking: The Underlying Theory
In 1991, Professor Bruce Ackerman introduced the first volume of a
multi-volume project called We the People.3"
In this volume,
25. See infra Part I1.A.
26. See infra Part II.B.
27. See infra Part III.A.
28. See infra Part III.B.
29. Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 9, at 26.
30. 1 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations
Ackerman, Foundations].

(1991)

[hereinafter

2002]

CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION

Foundations,Ackerman focuses on the Constitution and its two-track
system of lawmaking, called dualism.3' One legislative track consists
of everyday decisions made by the government, while the other track
is the product of a "mobilized and politically self-conscious majority"
resulting in greater, revolutionary change. Volume Two of this
project, published in 1998 and titled Transformations,uses the dualist
system to explain the Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal as
periods of heightened engagement from the People.32
The centerpiece of Professor Ackerman's thesis is that normal
lawmaking, that is, everyday legislation, is distinct from constitutional
change, or higher lawmaking.33 This conclusion appears obvious on its
face, for constitutional change by definition is a major change in
government,3 4 and is very different in both procedure and substance
from laws that are passed by Congress. Major constitutional change is
marked by a change in constitutional interpretation that ten years
before was not "within th[e] evolutionary envelope of possibility."3 5
Ackerman, however, is stating more than just the obvious. Higher
lawmaking is unique in that it is driven by prolonged periods of
political awareness and, more importantly, by political activism on the
part of the People.36
The underlying premise of Ackerman's thesis is that the power of
the United States Government was initially and still is derived from
the People.37 "People" in this context refers to the American
electorate in the same way as the Constitution uses the word in the
Preamble to the Constitution.38 The Founders purposely declared that
the power and force of this new document-the Constitution -came
from the People.39 The People and the states relinquished power to
the government so that it could effectively govern; thus, the
government was subject to the People rather than the other way
around.4 0

31. Id. at 5-6.
32. Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 9.
33. Id. at 5.
34. However, not every amendment has resulted in a major change in
government. See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. XXVII.
35. Bruce Ackerman, Revolution on a Human Scale, 108 Yale L.J. 2279, 2287
(1999) [hereinafter Ackerman, Revolution].
36. Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 9, at 6.
37. Id. at 3-4.
38. Id.
39. "We the People of the United States . . . do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America." U.S. Const. pmbl.; see also
Ackerman, Foundations, supra note 30, at 167-79. Abraham Lincoln referred to this
very idea when he spoke of the "government of the people, by the people, and for the
people" during his Gettysburg Address. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 19, at 1050
(quoting Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address, reprinted in Gary Wills, Lincoln at
Gettysburg: The Words that Remade America 263 (1997)).
40. See Ackerman, Foundations, supra note 30, at 183-86.
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The dualist democracy theory has wide implications in the context
of American lawmaking. If the power of the government is derived
from the People, major constitutional change-change that shakes the
foundation of the government-can only occur during those episodes
in which the People speak out in force. To bring about reform, the
People must repeatedly gain overwhelming support for their initiative
in deliberative assemblies and consecutive popular elections so that
the elected leaders may revise the foundation of our government in
their name.4 Accordingly, it is possible for constitutional change to
occur outside of Article V, as long as the change comes from the
People.42 Major constitutional change during periods of normal
lawmaking by elected politicians, without the impetus of the populace,
is therefore illegitimate.43
It is illegitimate not because it is
unconstitutional but because the popular atmosphere surrounding the
change does not support such a change. Thus, constitutional change is
less a distinction between a formal amendment and normal legislative
change than it is a distinction between higher lawmaking and normal
lawmaking.
Ackerman's theory conspicuously ignores one branch of the federal
government entirely-the Federal Judiciary. The theory ignores the
Supreme Court's role in lawmaking because the Court has no power
under the Constitution to legislate or to execute the law;" therefore, it
does not have any capacity to initiate the normal lawmaking process,
let alone the higher lawmaking process. The Supreme Court does
play a role; however, "a larger part will be played by Presidents and
Congresses-and their efforts to gain the support of the American
people at general elections."45 In Ackerman's view, the Court enters
the higher lawmaking process only when legislation is challenged on
constitutional grounds.46 Its role is one of reaction, and any legislating
in which it engages results through its decisions regarding existing
legislation.
Ackerman's theory is retrospective. The theory provides no guide
to the future, nor does it inform the President and Congress how to
act; rather it is meant as a guide to differentiate among episodes of
non-Article V lawmaking for the purpose of determining what
41. Id. at 4.
42. Article V describes the process by which the Constitution is amended. U.S.
Const. art. V. It goes without saying that Ackerman does not believe that Article V
prescribes an exclusive process. "None of [Article V's] 143 words say anything like
'this Constitution may only be amended through the following procedures, and in no
other way.' The article makes its procedures sufficient, but not necessary, for the
enactment of a valid amendment." Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 9, at 15.
43. Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 9, at 5.
44. See U.S. Const. art. III.
45. Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 9, at 17.
46. Id. This would occur when the Court declares a certain act or section of an act
unconstitutional, changing the way that the law is enforced or the way that Congress
solves the problem that it is addressing. Id.

2002]

CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION

legislation qualifies as higher lawmaking. To differentiate between
valid instances of higher lawmaking and invalid ones, Ackerman
highlights a four-step pattern present during periods of higher
lawmaking.4 7 First, there is a signal, an indication from the People
that change is needed.4" Second, there is a constitutional impasse, in
which the branches of the federal government disagree on an
interpretation of the Constitution.4 9 Third, the impasse is followed by
an electoral mandate, supporting one branch's opinion in favor of
constitutional reform, inciting a challenge to the minority institution,
and culminating in a switch in interpretation by the minority
Fourth, the change is followed by a consolidating
institution."
election in which politics returns to normal.5 The process is meant to
take place over a number of years, thus ensuring that the People have
spoken. Because of the multi-staged, prolonged nature of the higher
lawmaking procedure, its occurrence is rare." Ackerman focuses on
three major episodes in American history as examples of past higher
lawmaking: the Founding,53 the ratification of the Civil War
Amendments,54 and the "switch in time" of the New Deal Court.5
B. The Theory in Motion: The New Deal56
An examination of Ackerman's theory as it applies to the New Deal
best illustrates the underlying process of constitutional change. The
New Deal is a useful illustration, not only because it is more recent
than the Civil War Amendments, but also because this transformation
This
occurred outside of Article V's amendment process.
against
backdrop
a
useful
provides
framework, once established,
which to compare the events of the modern era. For if we are in the
midst of another period of higher lawmaking and constitutional

47. Id. at 20.
48. Id. at 17.
49. Id. at 20.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Justice Kennedy has noted that, although there are twenty-seven amendments
to the Constitution, only four sets of amendments have much significance. Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy, Speech at Fordham University School of Law (Jan. 20, 2001).
These were the Bill of the Rights, the Civil War Amendments, the creation of the
income tax and the extension of the right to vote to women. These four events,
examples of higher lawmaking, illustrate that higher lawmaking is not only a rare
occurrence, but also a harbinger of monumental change.
53. Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 9, at 32-68.
54. Id. at 7-13, 99-254.
55. Id. at 17-26.
56. For a more detailed, but not necessarily different, version of the events of the
New Deal era, see Laura Kalman, Law, Politics and the New Deal(s), 108 Yale L.J.
2165 (1999). Without objecting to the legal analysis, Professor Kalman argues that
Ackerman's historical account is overly simplified.
57. Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 9, at 383.
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change, it is taking place outside of the procedure set forth in Article
V.
1. The Signal
In November of 1932, Franklin Delano Roosevelt was swept into
the presidency with 57.4% of the popular vote.5 ' He brought with him
ninety-seven new Democrats into the House of Representatives and
twelve new Democrats into the Senate. 59 After the election, 310
Democrats occupied seats in the House, compared to 117
Republicans, and Democrats enjoyed a 61-35 advantage over
Republicans in the Senate."'
This monumental shift in power was not surprising because most
Americans attributed the Great Depression to President Hoover and
his Republican party. The economy of the United States was in ruins:
unemployment levels were near 25%, prices had dropped by 37% and
the gross domestic product had dropped by almost 50%.61 According
to Ackerman, Roosevelt's rousing success in 1932 reflected not a
mandate to govern from the People, but a rejection of the
incumbent.62
President Roosevelt's plan was to alter the economy radically by
enacting federal regulations, even though this was a power that the
government did not yet have.63
Within four months of his
inauguration, President Roosevelt signed the National Industrial
Recovery Act ("NIRA") into law. 64 The Act allowed the government
to serve as a regulator of economic life, abolishing the free market
system. Other acronymic acts followed, each one regulating a sector
of the economy, with some teetering on the edge of socialism.66
Congress passed each regulation without considering whether the laws
fit within the federal government's limited powers.67 Clearly, there
existed an unwillingness on Capital Hill to obstruct President
Roosevelt's proposals for sweeping reform. While the New Deal had
opponents within the Republican party, those opponents believed that
58. Rusk, supra note 2, at 132.

59. Price, supra note 6, at 157.
60. Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 9, at 286. Because Alaska and
Hawaii had not yet been admitted as states in the Union, only ninety-six members
constituted the Senate.
61. Price, supra note 6, at 157.
62. Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 9, at 281.
63. Jackson, supra note 9, at 76-78.
64. Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 9, at 286-87.
65. Id.

66. Id. at 288. Ackerman views the Tennessee Valley Authority as Roosevelt's
socialistic experiment. Id. Other programs that gained Congressional approval during
this time included the regulation of unions, agricultural controls, working condition
standards, and the regulation of Wall Street with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Id.
67. Jackson, supra note 9, at 76-78.
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they could not publicly contest the legislation, as such a battle would
cost too much political capital." Consequently, Congress passed
President Roosevelt's proposals one after the other with wide
support.69
With these reforms before them, the populace returned to the polls
in 1934. Throughout American history, the President's party has
rarely achieved victory in midterm Congressional elections.7"
Moreover, in 1934, the socialist tilt of the administration, as well as the
far-reaching legislation legitimizing that vision, provided the
Republican Party with a solid platform from which to attack the
President and his party.71 The federal government was systematically
absorbing the duties of the states, an event that had been feared since
the Founding. The Republicans believed a sweeping victory in both
houses was at hand.72 Their hopes were dashed, however, when the
People elected 322 Democrats and only 103 Republicans to the House
of Representatives. 3 In the Senate, the gap widened to sixty-nine
Democrats and twenty-five Republicans.
Additionally, the
Republican representatives who were elected were far more
progressive than their predecessors had been two years earlier, as
eight leading conservatives lost their seats .71
Instead of a backlash against the President's ideology and party, the
Democrats received, as one New York Times columnist dubbed it
"the most overwhelming victory in the history of American politics."75
The People's vote reflected support for the Democrats and thus, for
President Roosevelt's legislative agenda. The New Deal had been the
central issue in both parties' campaigns and the People gave
resounding support to its proponents.7 6 The midterm election was a
great personal victory for President Roosevelt and, by extension, for
the New Deal, as "even Republicans had invoked Roosevelt's name to
get elected."77 President Roosevelt and his Democrats now possessed
an indisputable mandate from the People to continue with the New
Deal, and thereby increase the power of the federal government."

68. Baker, supra note 13, at 109.
69. See id.; Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 9, at 285, 288-89.
70. Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 9, at 289; Rusk, supra note 2, at 132,
216, 377.
71. See Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 9, at 288, 289.
72. Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 Va. L. Rev. 201, 229
(1994) [hereinafter Cushman, Court].
73. Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 9, at 289.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Cushman, Structure, supra note 4, at 26 (quoting Leuchtenburg, Franklin D.
Roosevelt and the New Deal 116-17 (1963)).
77. Id.
78. Id.
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2. A Constitutional Impasse
One small group of Americans did not support the New Deal. The
era before the New Deal found its most powerful judicial expression
in the 1905 Supreme Court decision of Lochner v. New York.79 In
Lochner, the Court held that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments protect liberty of contract and private
property against unwarranted governmental interference. 81
While Lochner today is "one of the most condemned cases in
United States history and has been used to symbolize judicial
dereliction and abuse,""1 it accurately reflected the prevailing
economic and social philosophy of the time.8" The laissez-faire
doctrine of Adam Smith, the eighteenth-century economist, combined
with the thinking of Herbert Spencer, the nineteenth-century social
Darwinist, swayed the Court into placing the "fundamental" rights of
property over and above the regulations passed by the state
legislatures. 3
This precedent stood directly in the path of President Roosevelt's
New Deal.' On January 7, 1935, by its decision in Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan 8 1 and then again on May 27, 1935, by its decision in
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, the Supreme Court
declared unconstitutional major provisions of the New Deal. 6 The
latter decision signaled the end of the NIRA, the crown jewel of
President Roosevelt's New Deal legislation. The Court unanimously
79. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
80. Id. at 53-54.
81. Barry Friedman, The History of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, Part Three:
The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1383, 1390 n.20 (2001) (citing Bernard H.
Siegan, Economic Liberties and the Constitution 23 (1980)).
82. Id. at 1424.
83. Id. at 1422. Not all members of the Court adhered to this philosophy. As
Justice Holmes argued in his Lochner dissent,
the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is held
to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said
that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute
proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been
understood by the traditions of our people and our law.
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76.
84. Price, supra note 6, at 158. For example, "between 1899 and 1937, the
Supreme Court invalidated over 180 state statutes as unconstitutional, primarily on
due process or equal protection grounds." Id.; e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905) (holding that a New York statute restricting working hours in a bakery
violated the substantive due process right of liberty of contract). But see Jack Wade
Nowlin, The Constitutional Illegitimacy of Expansive Judicial Power: A Populist
Structural Interpretive Analysis, 89 Ky. L.J. 387, 454-57 (2000/2001) (stating that
Lochner symbolized an era of radical judicial activism with regards to the use of the
Fourteenth Amendment in invalidating laws).
85. 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (invalidating a section of the NIRA pertaining to the oil
industry).
86. 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (the "Sick Chicken" case).
87. Id. at 528.
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held that the federal government's requirement that trade associations
adopt codes of fair competition was an unconstitutional expansion of
The Court stated that, "[w]ithout in any way
federal power."
disparaging th[e] motive [of Congress], it is enough to say that the
recuperative efforts of the Federal Government must be made in a
manner consistent with the authority granted by the Constitution."8 9
After Schechter, known to posterity as the "Sick Chicken" case, the
Supreme Court continued to strike down legislation throughout the
rest of 1935 and into 1936. 9" The Court was at a constitutional impasse
with both Congress and the President.
President Roosevelt acted as if the Court's opinion in Schechter was
a direct challenge to his presidency and he responded by giving an
uninterrupted 90-minute press conference attacking the decision. 9
President Roosevelt criticized the opinion from a legalistic
perspective, aimed not at the outcome of the case, but at its
reasoning.92 Strikingly, President Roosevelt isolated the issue at stake
and charged the American public to act:
Is the United States going to decide, are the people of this country
going to decide that their Federal government shall in the future
have no right under any implied power or any court-approved power
to enter into a solution of a national economic problem, but that
that national
economic problem must be decided only by the
93
States?
President Roosevelt now charged the People to decide what type of
government they wanted.
The fact that President Roosevelt had taken the issue to the public
was not as remarkable as the method by which he communicated his
message. He spoke to the public as if they had all read and
comprehended the Court's opinion in Schechter. Dissecting each
section of the opinion, he argued constitutional doctrine, challenging
the Court's reading of its proscriptions. 94 The message was not
processed and simplified, it was not rhetoric and it certainly was not
filled with campaign slogans. 95
As Ackerman notes, President
Roosevelt was actually engaged in an unprepared intellectual
conversation with the public.96 Even the press ran with the story,
detailing the constitutional impasse between the President and the
Court with great specificity. 97
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 551.
Id. at 550.
O'Brien, Constitutional Law, supra note 12, at 549-50.
Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 9, at 297.
Id.
FDR and the Supreme Court, supra note 3.
Id.
Id.
Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 9, at 298.
Id. at 299-300. This is striking considering the nature of the press today when

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

On the legislative front, President Roosevelt came back at the
Court with his Second New Deal. The new legislation no longer
attempted to supplant the free market system entirely, but instead
sought to regulate it to protect against abuses.98 While this method
existed in parts of the original New Deal, such as the Securities Acts
of 1933 and 1934, this regulatory theme now became the new focus of
President Roosevelt's plan.99 With the conflict now defined, both
sides stuck to their positions as the Presidential election of 1936
approached.
Ackerman asserts that when the voters went to the polls that
November, they went to decide the future direction of the country....
Nevertheless, President Roosevelt remained somewhat silent in the
last few months before the election.
This reticence was
uncharacteristic for the President, especially given the Supreme
Court's deluge of anti New-Deal opinions."" Some historians argue
that President Roosevelt was trying to retreat from the strong position
that he took after Schechter.l"' A more plausible explanation is that
the President saw that the issue no longer needed provoking-his
1
opponents were doing a fine job of provoking the issue themselves. 03
As one columnist wrote at the time, "[i]nterest in the political
situation is intense because the vote this Fall will shape our individual
lives and the nation's future. This election will determine who shall
appoint perhaps a majority of the Supreme Court."" 4 This message
was repeated throughout the entire year, sometimes even including
dramatic accounts about President Roosevelt's "intention" to pack
the Court with liberal justices if he were re-elected, even though
President Roosevelt had not yet announced any such intention."5
The Republican Party fueled the controversy. Former President
Herbert Hoover's speech at the Party's convention in June maligned
it comes to covering politics. The stories of Whitewater, Travelgate, Monica
Lewinsky, the Lincoln Bedroom and Enron are prime examples. Deplorably, these
stories got larger press coverage than the government did during the two times it shut
down during the mid-1990's due to the lack of a budget. The recent constitutional
controversy of the 2000 Presidential election was seemingly "dumbed down" by the
press, especially the television media-who treated it as ifit were another political
scandal. The broadcasting of the truck carrying the ballots up to Tallahassee was very
similar to the way in which O.J. Simpson's Bronco was followed by the cameras in
1994.
98. Id. at 301-02.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 310. Contra, William E. Leuchtenburg, When the People Spoke, What
Did They Say?: The Election of 1936 and the Ackerman Thesis, 108 Yale L.J. 2077
(1999); Price, supra note 6, at 181.
101. Leuchtenburg, supra note 100, at 2082-87.
102. See Jackson, supra note 9, at 177.
103. Id.
104. Leuchtenburg, supra note 100, at 2088-89 (quoting Gannett Calls Borah the
Best Candidate, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23,1936, at 31).
105. Id.at 2095-97.
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President Roosevelt's attempt to usurp judicial power and charged the
People to stand up to Roosevelt." 6 The Party's platform was even
more aggressive. It lambasted the Democratic Party's betrayal of
American traditions and the American people.0 7 Commenting on
President Roosevelt's attack on the integrity and authority of the
Court, it pledged "to maintain the American system of Constitutional
and local self government, and to resist all attempts to impair the
authority of the Supreme Court of the United States."' 0 8 The
Republican presidential candidate, Alf Landon, continued this attack,
and yet he realized that the Constitution was no more of a winning
issue than it had been in 1934."' 9 He was not completely silent and
while he did support a few aspects of the New Deal, he criticized
"laws 'which an untrammeled Congress would not have passed and a
wise Executive would not have signed.''. 0 Landon further criticized
the President for taking such an aggressive stance against the Court."'
Critics of the Court who supported the President, most notably
members of Congress, were also very vocal in the months preceding
the campaign." 2 Additionally, the Court provoked this ideological
hornets' nest in its final decision of the 1935-1936 term, Morehead v.
New York ex rel. Tipaldo,"3 which overturned a minimum wage law
for women." 4 The decision created a large amount of press and
single-handedly shifted public opinion away from the Court."' While
sixty percent of newspapers publicly opposed President Roosevelt's
reelection, "a sample of 344 editorials found only ten.., favorably
disposed toward the [Tipaldo] ruling."'" 6
Americans became
increasingly aware that the Constitution, as interpreted by the sitting
Court, did not "offer protection for the most essential conditions of
life to even the poorest and weakest of its members.""' 7

106. "Suppose these New Deal acts had remained upon the statute books. We
would have been a regimented people. Have you any assurance that he will not have
the appointments if he is re-elected?" Id. at 2090 (quoting Herbert Hoover, Address
Delivered to the Republican National Convention, (June 10, 1936)).
107. Id. at 2091 (citing Republican Platform for 1936, in National Party Platforms
1840-1956, at 365, 365-66 (Kirk H. Porter & Donald Bruce Johnson eds., 1956)).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2092. Landon pledged to support laws protecting women and children
as to maximum hours, minimum wages and working conditions. Id. at 2091.
110. Id. at 2092 (quoting The Texts of Governor Landon's Addresses Yesterday,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1936, at 21 (transcribing the speech by Gov. Alf Landon in
Detroit on Oct. 13, 1936)).
111. Id. at 2092.
112. Id. at 2100.
113. 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
114. Id. at 603-04, 611.
115. Leuchtenburg, supra note 100, at 2102-03.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 2103 (quoting Dorothy Thompson, N.Y. Herald Trib., June 4, 1936, at
23).
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While the Court continued to ravish the New Deal, it was not
immune to the ideological controversy surrounding its decisions.
Within the Court itself, several justices wrote seething dissents against
the anti-New Deal decisions. Justice Stone, dissenting in United States
v. Butler,11 criticized the Court's opinion as "hardly ris[ing] to the
dignity of argument," and opined that the Court itself was not
immune from abuse." 9 He continued, "It must be remembered that
legislators are the ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of
the people in quite as great a degree as the courts."' 20 Justice Cardozo
also admonished the Court in his dissents, stating that the decisions
were overturning sound legislative decisions in favor of
irresponsibility. 121
Polling data gathered by George Gallup provides some insight into
the minds of the People. 2 A November 1935 poll showed that
employment and the economy were the two most vital issues facing
the country at the time.'23 Another poll conducted just after the
election in 1936 had almost 60% of those polled believing that the
Supreme Court needed to review the New Deal more liberally.'
A
year after the election, a poll found that 13% of Americans still
believed that the Supreme Court's New Deal opinions were the most
interesting events in 1937, even though the Court was now upholding
the New Deal and was thus less controversial. 2 5 Another 27.5%
believed that the controversy surrounding the court packing plan was
the most interesting issue, trailing the Sino-Japanese War and the
floods in Ohio by less than one percent. 26 This data shows that the
American populace was not only aware of, but also was deeply
concerned with the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence and
the impasse regarding the feasibility of the New Deal. The New
Deal's plan to revive the nation's economy was the most important
issue in the election and was constantly addressed by many interested
27
parties on all sides of the debate.

118. 297 U.S. 1 (1935).
119. Id. at 87 (Stone, J., dissenting).
120. Id. (quoting Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270
(1904)).
121. Jones v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 298 U.S. 1, 32 (1936) (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
122. See generally George H. Gallup, 1 The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971
(1972). Gallup began collecting data in the mid-1930s and quickly made a name for
himself because he was the only pollster accurately to predict Roosevelt's landslide
victory in 1936. John H. Lienhard, Engines of Our Ingenuity, No. 1199: Gallup Poll, at
http://www.uh.edu/engines/epi1l99.htm.
123. Gallup, supra note 122, at 5.
124. Id. at 43.
125. Id. at 80.
126. Id.
127. Baker, supra note 13, at 43-45; Jackson, supra note 9, at 176-77.

20021

CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION
3. The Electoral Mandate and the "Switch in Time"

With the future of the New Deal on the line, the People went to the
polls in 1936. President Roosevelt won 523 electoral votes, winning
every state except Maine and Vermont, and 60.8% of the popular
vote.1 28 No other President had achieved so great an electoral victory
since James Monroe, who ran uncontested in 1820; no other president
has achieved such a feat in the sixty-six years that have followed.129
Landon managed to win only 36.54% of the popular vote.1 3 The polls
drew a turnout 61.1% of eligible voters, compared with 56.8% in
1932,131 reflecting an increase of six million voters. 32 In terms of the
entire eligible adult population, the election drew 57.7% to the polls
in 1936 compared with 53.2% in 1932.133 With the influx of new
voters, President Roosevelt received 4,951,612 more votes in 1936
than he did in 1932.134 Equally as impressive, the Democrats gained
thirteen seats in the House, for a total of 335, and seven seats in the
Senate for a total of seventy-six.1 5 The Republicans were left with
only eighty-nine seats in the House and sixteen in the Senate. 36
While the public may have been against weakening the power of the
Court to review congressional legislation,137 President Roosevelt's
landslide reelection is proof that he had wide support for his recovery
effort, which supported the expansion of federal powers.'3 8 As
Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson noted, "[t]he election had
gone against the Court quite as emphatically as against the
'
Republican Party, whose bedfellow it had been."139
With the
depressed economy greatly influencing the voters' decision, the reelection gave President Roosevelt the mandate that he needed to push
forward.14
President Roosevelt signaled to the nation that he had won a
mandate to change the nature of the federal government and that he
had every intention to use that mandate in pushing his reforms
forward. On February 5, 1937, President Roosevelt announced to
Congress his plan to increase the size of the Supreme Court, adding an
128. Leuchtenburg, supra note 100, at 2108; Rusk, supra note 2, at 132-33.
129. Leuchtenburg, supra note 100, at 2108.
130. See Rusk, supra note 2, at 132.
131. Id. at 52.
132. Jackson, supra note 9, at 176. This was in addition to the three million more
voters who came to the polls in 1932 compared with 1928. Id.
133. Rusk, supra note 2, at 51.
134. Jackson, supra note 9, at 176.
135. Rusk, supra note 2, at 215, 377.
136. Id.
137. Gallup, supra note 122, at 43; Leuchtenburg, supra note 100, at 2111.
138. Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 9, at 310-11; see also Jackson, supra
note 9, at 176-79.
139. Jackson, supra note 9, at 177.
140. Id. at 177-79.
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additional justice for every justice currently over seventy years old. 4'
This plan would have enlarged the Court at that time by six members,
"infusi[ng] new blood" into the Court, and allowing President
Roosevelt to appoint justices who would uphold the New Deal.'42
In retrospect, it is unlikely that Congress, especially given the
eruption of acrimonious debate in both houses over the plan, would
have approved of President Roosevelt's court packing scheme."4 In
the alternative, President Roosevelt could have dealt with the Court
by advocating for an amendment to the Constitution that essentially

ratified the New Deal. The amendment most certainly would have
altered the balance of power between the national government and
the states in favor of Washington.
The problem was that an
amendment would not have solved the perceived crises with the speed
and efficiency that President Roosevelt thought was necessary.'44 The

amendment process is inherently slow because it requires passing
through the gauntlet that is state ratification. 45 President Roosevelt

probably feared that an amendment with such sweeping reforms

would not have passed this requirement.1 46 With state approval in
question, President Roosevelt attempted
to bypass the states by
1 47
taking dead aim at the Supreme Court.

The court packing plan was cut short because of the Supreme
Court's ruling in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,decided on March
141. Id. at 187-88.
142. Id.
143. Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 9, at 320-33. "The President's Court
proposal hit the country like a bombshell. 'For five months, the mass media,
Congress, and the president focused on little else ... the Court has not since then
surfaced so long and so prominently on the public agenda, even during the salad days
of the Warren Court."' Id. at 324 (quoting Greg Caldeira, Public Opinion and the U.S.
Supreme Court: FDR's Court-Packing Plan, 81 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1139, 1140, 1144
(1987)).
144. Jackson, supra note 9, at 179.
145. Id.
146. Price, supra note 6, at 191. "[T]hirteen States which contain only five percent
of the voting population can block ratification even though the thirty-five States with
ninety-five percent of the population are in favor of it." Ackerman, Transformations,
supra note 9, at 326 (quoting The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D.
Roosevelt 132 (Samuel Rosenman ed., 1937)). While Roosevelt feared this scenario,
it may have bordered on the unrealistic-the election of 1.936 brought with it thirtyeight Democratic governors and liberal governors in three others. Id. at 341 (quoting
Burton Wheeler, Speech of February 19, 1937, 10 P.M., NBC Museum of Public
Broadcasting, box t37-23, disks 4995-96). Additionally, Democrats controlled both
houses of the legislatures of thirty-three states and of the remaining fifteen states, two
were non-partisan, seven were divided, and only in six were both houses Republican.
Id. (citing Rafael Gely & Pablo Spiller, The Political Economy of Supreme Court
ConstitutionalDecisions: The Case of Roosevelt's Court Packing Plan, 12 Int'l Rev. L.
& Econ. 45, 63 (Table 5) (1992)).
147. This is almost revolutionary. The state governments, which at the Founding
were considered more representative of the people than the federal government, were
now thought of as a hindrance to reform. See generally The Federalist Nos. 45, 46, at
256-68 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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29, 1937.148 In West Coast Hotel, which overruled Adkins v. Children's
Hospital of D.C.,149 the Court gave its first opinion in support of the
New Deal by upholding the constitutionality of a state law that
regulated employment conditions and wages for women. 1
The
Court's logic showed a genuine switch in the ideological tenor of the
Court. Proving that this was not a fluke, the Court in NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp.5 ' upheld the National Labor Relations Act, a
major cornerstone of the New Deal."5 2
This change reflected a genuine reversal of opinion, rather than a
response to President Roosevelt's court packing plan. In fact, Justice
Roberts had already switched his position when the Court's
preliminary vote on West Coast Hotel was taken." 3 The switch
occurred before President Roosevelt had even announced his
intention to pack the Court.154 With the switch, the debate between a
formal amendment and President Roosevelt's court packing plan was
moot, and the constitutional impasse between two parts of the federal
government came to an end. There was no longer a need to assert the
legitimacy of the New Deal, as the Court had succumbed to the will of
the country.
4. The Consolidation Election
The approach of the midterm elections in 1938 gave the
Republicans a final realistic chance to challenge the emerging
constitutional change. The trend toward the expansion of federal
government could still be modified, or even reversed, by a sweeping
Republican victory.'55 Moreover, a victory in 1938 could possibly lead
to capturing the presidency two years later, divesting control of Court
appointments from President Roosevelt and the New Deal
Democrats.
However, the Republicans essentially acquiesced to the emergence
of the new era of constitutional politics. Neither in 1938, nor in the
presidential election of 1940, did the Republican candidates make
President Roosevelt's New Deal a campaign issue. 56 Senatorial
resistance against President Roosevelt's liberal Supreme Court
appointments never materialized, and in the 1940 election, the only
constitutional issue that the Republican candidate Wendell Willkie

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

300 U.S. 379 (1937).
261 U.S. 525 (1923).
Price, supra note 6, at 162-63.
301 U.S. 1 (1937); see Price, supra note 6, at 163.
Price, supra note 6, at 163.
Geoffrey R. Stone et al., Constitutional Law 215 (3d. ed. 1996).
Id.
Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 9, at 355.
Id. at 355-57.
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discussed was that of President Roosevelt running for a third term.'5 7
Willkie's nomination itself signaled the end of the struggle, as Willkie
was a self-declared liberal democrat who publicly supported much of
the major New Deal legislation.'5 8 Once President Roosevelt was
elected for his third term, more Court nominations were confirmed
without a fight in the Senate, and the transformation became

complete. 159
C. The New Deal as Higher Lawmaking
The Supreme Court's decision in West Coast Hotel was not an
aberration. Rather, this decision heralded a new era of constitutional
interpretation allowing for broader congressional power under the
Commerce Clause.'6 But, was this "switch in time" an example of
higher lawmaking? Is it deserving of the same precedential weight
traditionally accorded to the Constitution and its amendments?
The amendment process in Article V is necessarily an arduous path
to traverse. The requirement that three-quarters of the states ratify
any amendment 6' creates a high barrier to change. A New Deal
Amendment might have faced immense opposition from the states
because it would have expanded federal power to the detriment of
state autonomy.'62 The fact that the constitutional changes underlying
the New Deal were accomplished without going through the Article V
amendment process challenges their legitimacy.163 If the change, as an
amendment, would have faced staunch opposition in the states, how
can it be a constitutional change deserving the higher lawmaking
distinction? Nevertheless, the New Deal achieved legitimacy because
it satisfied the four steps of Ackerman's model. The switch eliminated
any need for a constitutional amendment. After President Roosevelt
had achieved victory, the popular support that once might have
ratified an amendment diminished due to lack of interest. It is
therefore disingenuous to discount what occurred simply because the
Court had preempted Article V and the amendment process.
157. Id. at 357.
158. Id. "In his acceptance speech, Willkie declared himself 'a liberal Democrat
who changed his party affiliation because he found democracy in the Republican
party rather than the New Deal party."' Id. (quoting N.Y. Times, August 18, 1940, § 1,
at 13.)
159. Id. at 358; see generally Jackson, supra note 9, at 232-86. Roosevelt elevated
Harlan F. Stone to Chief Justice, and appointed Robert H. Jackson, James F. Byrnes
and Wiley B. Rutledge. Stone, supra note 153, at ci.
160. See Stone, supra note 153, at 215.
161. U.S. Const. art. V.
162. Price, supra note 6, at 195.
163. See id. at 190. The fact that a New Deal amendment might have faced staunch
opposition in the states has little to do with the efficacy of Roosevelt's plans for
economic recovery. The states would have objected to the amendment because of the
absolute decrease in their power, altering the vertical separation of powers in our
government. Id. at 195.
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Looking back at the New Deal, the four distinct periods of
Ackerman's higher lawmaking process are clearly defined. First, the
constitutional moment begins with a signal, the formal announcement
by the public that change is needed."6 A possible signal must be
confirmed by repeated support. In Ackerman's words, "no movement
for revolutionary reform can rightfully expect an easy victory for its
transformative vision. It must earn its claim to speak for the People
by repeatedly winning electoral support in the face of sustained
constitutional critique."16' 5 The election of Roosevelt in 1932 was the
initial signal that the People wanted change in the wake of the Great
Depression.'66 The signal was confirmed by the midterm election in
1934, in which the Democrats, under President Roosevelt's leadership,
took overwhelming control over both houses of Congress.'67
Second, the implementation of change with the New Deal led to the
conflict between the President and Congress on one side, and the
Court on the other side.168 As the Presidential election of 1936
approached, the debate between President Roosevelt's New Deal and
the Court's adherence to the notion of a limited federal government
169
spread to the electorate.
Third, the 1936 election brought continued support for the
President and his party.7 ' This "mandate" resulted in the eventual
"switch in time" by the Supreme Court, as New Deal legislation was
subsequently upheld as constitutional. 7' With the switch of the Court,
there was no need for a constitutional amendment because President
Roosevelt had achieved his desired result. The popular support,
which at one time might have pushed the states to ratify an
amendment regardless of the states' desire to retain their own power,
faded because the goal was achieved.
Finally, the switch was confirmed by the elections of 1938 and 1940,
which allowed President Roosevelt the opportunity to appoint justices
to the Supreme Court that would continue to uphold the New Deal
and its progeny.'7 2
The "switch in time" was a legitimate period of higher lawmaking
because the People had spoken-the People believed that President
Roosevelt presented a "manifest and irresistible proof[] of a better
administration." '73 The shape of the government changed because of
the new interpretation of the Constitution, a change necessary as a
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

See supra text accompanying note 48.
Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 9, at 291.
See supra text accompanying notes 58-62.
See supra text accompanying notes 70-78.
See supra text accompanying notes 84-99.
See supra text accompanying notes 100-27.
See supra text accompanying notes 128-36.
See supra text accompanying notes 148-54.
See supra text accompanying notes 155-59.
The Federalist No. 46, supra note 147, at 263.
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response to the crisis of the Great Depression. In this regard, the New

Deal era served "as the formative period of modernist governance in
America . . .whose special cultural significance was not unlike that

encompassing the Declaration of Independence,
the Revolutionary
'174
War, and the framing of the Constitution.
II. NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: COMMERCE CLAUSE
REDEFINED

Law is always subject to interpretation, regardless of whether it is
the product of higher lawmaking or ordinary lawmaking. The
difference is that higher lawmaking cannot be interpreted out of
existence. 75 Only a process of higher lawmaking has the power to

reverse past episodes of higher lawmaking. Thus, if the "switch in
time" was an episode of legitimate higher lawmaking, then another
mandate from the People is needed to back away from its precedent.
This part shifts focus to the past decade of Supreme Court
jurisprudence. Section A details the interpretation of the Commerce
Clause that now prevails on the Court and how this new interpretation

marks a drastic shift in our government's underlying structure.
Section B compares this change with Ackerman's explanation of the

New Deal, looking particularly at whether a mandate existed for the
revolution of the Reagan and Gingrich eras, and whether that
mandate was directed at affecting the specific ideological change

pursued by the Court.
176

A. Decline of the Commerce Clause

In the fifty-eight years since West Coast Hotel was decided, the

Commerce Clause has become a staple of national legislative power.'77
Congress has used this power to pass statutes regarding, inter alia,
economic regulation,'17 federal criminal law,'179 and civil rights. s This
174. G. Edward White, The Constitution and the New Deal 9 (2000).
175. But see The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (severely
limiting the "privileges or immunities" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
176. Although the Rehnquist Court revolution extends well beyond the Commerce
Clause, it is unnecessary to discuss it in its entirety. The purpose of this section is to
illustrate the current revolutionary movement underway in the Court, the Commerce
Clause being a prime example. Other areas where the revolution has extended
include the limitation on Congress's ability to pass civil rights legislation under
Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997); the limitation on the federal regulation of state instrumentalities in Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); and the limitation on the use of affirmative action
in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) and Adarand
Constructors,Inc. v.Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
177. See Price, supra note 6, at 166-67.
178. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding the marketing
penalties under the Agricultural Adjustment Act, discarding the direct and indirect
effects rule); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938).
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broad power, however, has come under increasing attack from the
Court, acting in the name of states' rights under the influence of now
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist.

1. Early Rumblings
The first inclination of change came in the 1976 case, National
League of Cities v. Usery,'s' where the Court held that three
amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act, which extended hour
and wage standards to all state, county, and municipal employees,
were unconstitutional.' The decision marked the first occasion since
the "switch in time" that the Court imposed a limit on Congress's use
of the Commerce Clause.'8 3 This decision is striking not so much
because of its outcome, but because of the reasoning that Justice
Rehnquist employed in writing the majority opinion. Interpreting the
Tenth Amendment, Rehnquist opined that the amendment was a
restriction on congressional power, prohibiting it from regulating the
"States as States."184
This interpretation contrasted with the
Amendment's traditional reading that it merely granted the states
residual power.'85 Furthermore, the Court held that it was its duty to
protect the states by restraining Congress. 86

179. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (upholding Congress'
prohibition of "loan sharking" under the Consumer Credit Protection Act).
180. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding unanimously the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 solely on Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause);
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (same).
181. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
182. Id. at 851-52.
183. See O'Brien, Constitutional Law, supra note 12, at 682.
184. Usery, 426 U.S. at 845. Rehnquist went on to state that
It is one thing to recognize the authority of Congress to enact laws regulating
individual businesses necessarily subject to the dual sovereignty of the
government of the Nation and of the State in which they reside. It is quite
another to uphold a similar exercise of congressional authority directed, not
to private citizens, but to the States as States. We have repeatedly
recognized that there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state
government which may not be impaired by Congress, not because Congress
may lack an affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, but
because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority in that
manner.
Id.
185. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941); see also Louis J.
Virelli III & David S. Leibowitz, "FederalismWhether They Want it or Not": The New
Commerce Clause Doctrine and the Future of Federal Civil Rights Legislation After
United States v. Morrison, 3 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 926, 944-45 (2001); Yarbrough, supra
note 21, at 111.
186. Usery, 426 U.S. at 852. In fact, less than a week later, in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
427 U.S. 445 (1976), Rehnquist, writing again for the Court, held that Congress could
prohibit state and local discriminatory actions under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
at 456; see O'Brien, Constitutional Law, supra note 12, at 683.
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This interpretation reflected a truly radical approach.' 87 Aside from
the fact that Rehnquist limited his reasoning to adjudicating cases
under the Commerce Clause,18s the Constitution simply does not

explicitly guarantee the states any specific powers. 8 9 Moreover, the

Constitution does not require the judiciary to protect state
sovereignty. 19°

As Justice Brennan argued in dissent in Usery,

"effective restraints on [Congress's commerce power] must proceed
from political rather than judicial processes."' 91 "Judicial restraint,"

he continued, "recognizes that the political branches of our
Government are structured to protect the interests of the States...
and that the States are fully able to protect their own interests."'

92

Legislation is proposed and passed by those who have the interest of
their state and its citizens in mind when they vote. Overwhelming
encroachments on state power by the federal government would affect
numerous states and plans of resistance will arise. 93
While the decision rejuvenated the federalism debate, the effect of
the holding was short-lived. Nine years after the Usery decision, the
Court refused to strike down another federal statute under the

decision's rationale.194 In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, the Court officially overturned Usery. 95 The Court held

that the amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act, which applied
minimum wage and overtime standards to state and local government

employees, was constitutional.' 96 In essence, Garcia affirmed Justice
Brennan's dissent in Usery.'97 However, this decision did not finalize

any issues. Garcia was a 5-4 decision, hardly strong precedent. 98

187. O'Brien, Constitutional Law, supra note 12, at 682. Underscoring this point,
Justice Blackmun, who was the majority's fifth vote, had reservations regarding the
scope of the opinion, and stated in his concurrence that he was "not untroubled by
certain possible implications of the Court's opinion-some of them suggested by the
dissents." Usery, 426 U.S. at 856.
188. O'Brien, Constitutional Law, supra note 12, at 683.
189. Instead, the Constitution grants the states all powers that are neither reserved
to the federal government nor prohibited. U.S. Const. amend. X.
190. Noonan, supra note 22, at 150-56.
191. Usery, 426 U.S. at 876 (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942)).
192. Id. (emphasis added).
193. See The Federalist, Nos. 45, 46, supra note 147, at 258-59, 265-66 (James
Madison).
194. O'Brien, Constitutional Law, supra note 12, at 683.
195. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). The Court stated that, "the attempt to draw the
boundaries of state regulatory immunity in terms of 'traditional governmental
function' is not only unworkable but is also inconsistent with established principles of
federalism and, indeed, with those very federalism principles on which [Usery]
purported to rest." Id. at 531.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 550-54. Notwithstanding the various changes that have occurred since
the Founding, including the Seventeenth Amendment, the states are still protected
from the reach of the Commerce Clause through the political process. Id. at 554.
198. Significantly, Justice Blackmun-who had reservations about Usery but joined
the majority-wrote the Garciaopinion.
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Additionally, the minority promised to pursue the overturning of
Garcia at their first opportunity.'99 Justice Rehnquist, who wrote the
in Usery, and the other justices were not going to quietly back
opinion
00
2

away.

2. United States v. Lopez
In the early 1990s, the rationale in Garcia was attacked, and
although Garcia was not overruled, its scope was severely limited.2 1
In 1995, the Court decided United States v. Lopez,2 °2 a decision that
pushed the Court in a new direction that threatened the legitimacy of
the "switch in time." For the first time since the New Deal era, the
Court struck down a federal statute for exceeding the scope of the
Commerce Clause. 2 3 At issue was the Gun Free School Zones Act,
which prevented the possession of a firearm at or near a school. In
invalidating the law, the Court set free the defendant, who was
arrested under the statute for carrying a loaded .38 caliber handgun to
school with him.20 4
The Court set up a three-part framework for deciphering
Commerce Clause cases, distinguishing between legislation that
"regulate[s] the use of the channels of interstate commerce";201
legislation that "regulate[s] and protect[s] the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce,
even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities";2 6
199. Garcia,469 U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
200. Id.
201. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991). The Court, in upholding
Missouri's mandatory retirement law as applied to judges, stated that Congress needs
to make a "plain statement" whenever it intends to preempt a power of the state with
the Commerce Clause. Id. at 460-61; see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992). Although the Court declined to overrule Garcia, it staunchly defended state
sovereignty, holding that Congress could not force the state legislatures to enact and
enforce federal programs. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 464. Dissenting, Justice White noted
that the congressional act resulted from the combined effort of state governors to
achieve a state-based remedy, because the Constitution mandates that "no State shall,
without the Consent of Congress.... enter into any Agreement or Compact with
another State." U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3; New York, 505 U.S. at 190 (White. J.,
"By invalidating the measure designed to ensure compliance for
dissenting).
recalcitrant States... the Court upsets the delicate compromise achieved among the
States and forces Congress to erect several additional formalistic hurdles to clear
before achieving exactly the same objective." New York, 505 U.S. at 210 (White, J.,
dissenting).
202. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
203. Candice Hoke, Arendt, Tushnet, and Lopez: The Philosophical Challenge
Behind Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Moments, 47 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 903,
911 (1997). The Usery Court did not hold that the legislation addressed exceeded the
powers granted by the Commerce Clause, but that the legislation did not apply to
state officials. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1976).
204. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
205. Id. at 558.
206. Id.
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and legislation that "regulate[s] those activities having a substantial
relation to interstate commerce. 2 7 The Court further concluded that,
based on precedent, only economic activities that have a substantial
relation to interstate commerce fall under the scope of congressional
28
Commerce Clause power. 0
To clarify the legislative landscape, the Court gave Congress some
direction for future legislation, as the Court no longer intended to
unconditionally defer to congressional judgment. 2 9
The Court
inferred that Congress should prove the "substantial relation to
interstate commerce" with legislative or congressional committee
findings whenever the connection is unclear on its face. 2"' These
legislative findings would help the Court evaluate the statute. 21' The
Gun Free School Zones Act, however, contained no legislative
findings, so it was unclear how much deference the Court would
extend to these findings.
In holding that Congress cannot encroach upon traditional state
powers, 2112 however, the Court did not establish from where this
concept was derived. Admittedly, the Commerce Clause does have a
built-in limitation, but that limitation is jurisdictional in nature rather
than substantive.213 Congress may not regulate activity that is
completely within a single state. Congress may regulate activity that
involves more than one state, regardless of the nature of that
214
activity.
In a concurrence, Justice Kennedy stated that the traditional state
power limitation arises out of the concept of federalism that is
inherent in the Tenth Amendment,2 5 which the Court had expounded
in New York v. United States.216 Thus, the foundation of Lopez relies
on the soundness of Justice O'Connor's opinion in New York, and her
21 7
use of the Tenth Amendment.
The reasoning in New York rested on an interpretation of the Tenth
Amendment that it was the Court's duty to determine whether a

207. Id. at 558-59.
208. Id. at 560.
209. Id. at 562-63.
210. Id.
211. See id. at 559.
212. Id. at 564.
213. Id. at 553 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,189-90 (1824)).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 576-78, 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring). "While the intrusion on state
sovereignty may not be as severe in this instance as in some of our recent Tenth
Amendment cases, the intrusion is nonetheless significant. Absent a stronger
connection or identification with commercial concerns that are central to the
Commerce Clause, that interference contradicts the federal balance the Framers
designed and that this Court is obliged to enforce." Id. at 583.
216. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
217. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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power delegated to Congress was limited by a state power. 218 This
interpretation was a departure from the previous belief that the Tenth
Amendment was just a formal statement of the obvious; whatever is
not granted to Congress remains with the states.219 The opinion in
New York, however, is unclear in defining how these limits on
Congress are determined, as O'Connor admits that they "are not
derived from the text. ''2211 One commentator claims that the limits are,
in fact, derived from the conscience of the Court itself. 22' Although
the contours of the new constitutional limits and how the Court
arrived at those limits were still unclear, it was apparent that the
Court had begun making inroads into the vast power that the
Commerce Clause had conferred to Congress over the previous sixty
years.
3. United States v. Morrison
This shift in Commerce Clause doctrine found reinforcement in
2 22
United States v. Morrison.
In Morrison, the Court overturned a
provision of the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA"), holding
that the regulated non-economic activity was beyond the limited scope
of the Commerce Clause.223 Congress passed the Act to remedy a
perceived failure by the states to provide a civil action for damages to
victims of gender-based crimes. 224 Taking a cue from Lopez, Congress
assembled extensive data showing the effect that violence against
women has on interstate commerce. 225 Their data showed that the
cost of such violence grew from roughly three billion dollars in 1990 to
between five and ten billion in 1993, and that the violence had the
effect of keeping women from participating in all aspects of the
economy. 226 As Judge Noonan comments, "that there was227 sufficient
evidence for Congress to act could scarcely be challenged.
The Court, using the same reasoning as in Lopez, discussed the
traditional eminence of the state in certain areas, such as criminal law
enforcement. 228 After Lopez, it appeared that as long as Congress
218. New York, 505 U.S. at 156-57.
219. E.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549 (1985)
(holding that the states' sovereign authority depends on which powers the
Constitution has transferred to the federal government); United States v. Darby
Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (holding that the Tenth Amendment is nothing
"but a truism"); see also Yarbrough, supra note 21, at 111 (agreeing with the belief
that the Tenth Amendment was nothing more than a "truism").
220. New York, 505 U.S. at 156.
221. Rossum, supra note 21, at 249.
222. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
223. Id. at 617.
224. Id. at 601-02; id. at 653 (Souter, J., dissenting).
225. Noonan, supra note 22, at 132.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
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kept its hands off traditional state concerns, such as criminal law, it
could still enact civil rights statutes under the Commerce Clause.229
The significance of Morrison is that it seemingly closed this "noneconomic loophole. ' '2311 In doing so, the Court modified the aggregate
effect standard established under Wickard v. Fulburn,T while
maintaining that its holding remained valid.232 The Morrison majority
held that activities that Congress regulated for their substantive effect
on commerce must themselves have an economic characteristic.23 3
Since gender-related crime is not an economic activity, Congress
could not regulate it by means of the Commerce Clause.
The invalidation of VAWA signaled the Court's drawing a sharp
distinction solely based on the difference between interstate
commerce affected by economic activity and interstate commerce
affected by non-economic activity. 234 This distinction was completely
new, as before the test depended on whether the activity substantially
affected interstate commerce, 235 not whether the nature of the activity
itself was economically based.236
Furthermore, the Court continued its trend of limiting the
deference that it had previously given to Congress during the sixty
years following the "switch in time." Whereas in Lopez, the Court
found fault with Congress's failure to produce legislative findings of
fact,237 the Morrison court rejected the clear congressional findings
that gender-motivated violence substantially affects interstate
commerce. 238 These findings were nearly identical to Congress's
findings that racial discrimination substantially affects interstate
commerce, 239 findings that the Court accepted in upholding Title II in
24
Katzenbach v. McClung.
Ironically, the Morrison Court itself
claimed to support the rationale of McClung.24 1
The new limits on the reach of the Commerce Clause and the
impact of congressional findings enforced by the Court had an even
greater implication. As Chief Justice Rehnquist, again writing for the
Court, stated,
229. Virelli & Leibowitz, supra note 185, at 956.
230. The Court also reasoned that the federal government was not justified in
interfering with existing state criminal law, as it traditionally has been an area of state
concern. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995).
231. 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942).
232. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18; Virelli & Leibowitz, supra note 185, at 957.
233. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609-11.
234. Virelli & Leibowitz, supra note 185, at 956.
235. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125; Virelli & Leibowitz, supra note 185, at 956-57.
236. Morrison,529 U.S. at 617.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 209-11.
238. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614-15.
239. Virelli & Leibowitz, supra note 185, at 957, 958.
240. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
241. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 635-36, 641; Virelli & Leibowitz, supra note 185, at 957-

2002]

CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION

[T]he existence of congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to
sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation....
Simply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity
substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make
it so. Rather, whether particular operations affect interstate
commerce sufficiently . . . is ultimately a judicial rather than a

legislative question, and can be settled finally only by this Court.242

The Court left the decision-making in its own hands without giving
Congress any standard by which to distinguish an activity that may be
quasi-economic. In doing so, the Court effectively increased its own
power vis-A-vis Congress, and thus kept itself free from any future
restraint in a subsequent case. Since 1937, Congress's power under
the Commerce Clause was not restricted to a categorical approach.
The only constraint that Congress had was that it needed to have a
rational basis for exercising its power.243 After Morrison, even a
rational basis does not satisfy the Court.
4. The End of the New Deal?
Recent cases have affirmed the fact that the Court established a
new formula for Commerce Clause cases when it decided Lopez and
Morrison. At the same time, these cases enhance the notion that the
standard is still unclear and almost impractical. In Solid Waste Agency
4
of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers,2
the Court was asked to decide whether the "Migratory Bird Rule," an
Army Corps of Engineers regulation interpreting the Clean Water
Act, gave jurisdiction to the Army Corps over intrastate ponds. 245 The
other issue before the Court was whether Congress had the authority
under the Commerce Clause to grant the Army Corps such
jurisdiction. 246 The Court held that the relevant section of the Clean
Water Act was clear, such that the "Migratory Bird Rule" exceeded
the authority that Congress granted the Army Corps. 247 Thus, the
constitutional question regarding the Commerce Clause was not
reached.
While the Court did not base its decision on the Commerce Clause,
the Court did briefly discuss the Commerce Clause, noting the
"serious constitutional problem" looming in the background.2 48 The
Court addressed the government's argument, based on the prior
Supreme Court opinion in Missouri v. Holland, that, the "protection
of migratory birds is a 'national interest of very nearly the first
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 (citations omitted).
Virelli & Leibowitz, supra note 185, at 951.
531 U.S. 159 (2001).
Id. at 166.
Id.
Id. at 170-73.
Id. at 173.
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magnitude,"' as well as the argument that the presence of migratory
birds substantially affects interstate commerce.249 The Court relied on
its reasoning in Morrison in focusing on the traditional control that
states had over intrastate concerns, yet at the same time, the majority
25
refused to retreat completely from the opinion in Holland.
The
majority did signal though, that if the Court had reached this issue, it
would have preserved the new restrictive interpretation of the
Commerce Clause.251
In the second case, Gibbs v. Babbit,252 the Fourth Circuit upheld a
challenge to a regulation promulgated by the Fish and Wildlife
Service ("FWS") under the Endangered Species Act.253 The FWS
designated the red wolf as a threatened species and, as part of a
reintroduction program, prohibited the "taking" of the endangered
species without prior authorization, even on private land.254
The Fourth Circuit held that the preservation of the wolf was an
economic activity, recognizing that a "close connection" existed
between preservation and commerce.255 The court stated that the
main reason why individuals "take" red wolves is to promote
commercial and economic interests.25 6 In turn, this "taking" affects
interstate commerce in areas such as tourism, scientific research and
commercial trade. 7 The court also relied on Missouri v. Holland,5 s
holding that federalism mandated intervention by Congress, since this
was an area of federal expertise and of extreme national
importance. 259 This view is seemingly at odds with the holdings in
Lopez and Morrison.2" Although the Fourth Circuit labeled the
preservation of the red wolf an "economic activity," it is no closer to
economic activity than was the Violence Against Women Act,
assuming the accuracy of the legislative findings. 26 1 At the very least,
this case illustrates the potential confusion that lower courts will have
in interpreting the Commerce Clause under the new standard,

249. Id. (quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,435 (1920)).
250. See Christy H. Dral & Jerry J. Phillips, Commerce by Another Name: Lopez,
Morrison, SWANCC, and Gibbs, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,413, 10,419-20 (2001); Virelli &
Leibowitz, supra note 185, at 966-67.
251. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 174; Virelli & Leibowitz, supra note 185, at 966-67.
252. 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001).
253. Id. at 487.
254. Id. at 488. The "takings" provision was altered with respect to private lands to
only prohibit those "takings" which were intentional or willful, except where the
taking relates to self-defense or the defense of others. Id.
255. Id. at 492-93.
256. Id. at 492.
257. Id. at 493-96.
258. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
259. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 500-01; Dral & Phillips, supra note 250, at 10,422.
260. Virelli & Leibowitz, supra note 185, at 969-70.
261. Id. at 970.
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especially since the Supreme Court is unwilling to reject the New Deal
cases and admit that the standard has changed.262
The Commerce Clause jurisprudence, which gave broad
interpretation to activities that affected interstate commerce prior to
the decisions in Lopez and Morrison,263 has been strictly limited to
extend to only economic activity.2 6 This change is evinced by the
Court's decision in Solid Waste, which emphasized the narrowing of
what qualifies as economic activity.
Moreover, in scrutinizing
legislative findings, the Court has declared that only it can truly
distinguish between what is and what is not economic activity. 5
Furthermore, the new standard is one that even Chief Justice
Rehnquist admitted was difficult to apply.266 By creating a standard
that makes it difficult for Congress to judge its future legislative acts
and is one that only the Court can truly distinguish on a case by case
basis, the 67 Court has increased its power to the detriment of
2
Congress.
B. Morning in America: The Reagan and Gingrich Revolutions and the
Dawn of a New Era?
Over the course of the past two decades, surrounding the alteration
of the Commerce Clause, two events had the potential of acting as
signals under Ackerman's theory-the Reagan revolution of 1980 and
the Gingrich revolution of 1994. Both events were marked by
sweeping Republican victories, and both events are potential parallels
to the events of the mid-1930s that ushered in the broader
interpretation of the Commerce Clause.
1. The Reagan Revolution
In 1980, Ronald Reagan became the fortieth President of the
United States. While he received only 50.75% of the popular vote,268
he received 90.89% of the electoral vote.269 In the House of
Representatives, the Republicans gained thirty-four new seats,
although they were still at a fifty-one seat disadvantage.
In the
Senate, the Republicans gained twelve new seats, giving them a seven

262. Dral & Phillips, supra note 250, at 10,418, 10,424.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 177-80.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 234-36.
265. See supra text accompanying note 242.
266. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995).
267. Dral & Phillips, supra note 250, at 10,421.
268. The 1980 election featured a third-party candidate, John B. Anderson, making
Reagan's capture of the majority of popular votes even more impressive than it might
otherwise appear. Rusk, supra note 2, at 132.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 216.
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" ' Dissatisfied with the Democrats'
seat advantage.27
control of the
Presidency and both branches of Congress during the preceding four
years, the People wanted change.272 On January 20, 1981, in his first
inaugural address, President Reagan proclaimed the need to limit
greatly the powers of the federal government, giving such power back
to the states.273 The People had spoken and many Democrats joined
274
the Reagan bandwagon out of fear that they would be left behind.
In the 1982 midterm election, the Republicans gained a seat in the
Senate, but lost twenty-two seats in the already Democrat-dominated
House.27 5 Clearly suffering a setback, President Reagan encountered
greater resistance in his transformative agenda. 276 Additionally, voter
turnout dropped dramatically, as only 39.8% of eligible adults and
61.1% of registered voters came to the polls. 277 However, all was not
lost-another landslide election and President Reagan's agenda could
get back on track.
In the 1984 presidential election, President Reagan garnered
58.77% of the popular vote and 97.58% of the electoral vote, losing
only Minnesota and the District of Columbia. 278 Republicans gained
sixteen seats in the House and only lost one seat in the Senate.279
While Reagan had a mandate to lead as President, his initiatives failed
to capture Congress.
The situation failed to improve, with
Republicans losing another five seats in the House and eight seats in
the Senate in the 1986 midterm election.28
Congress was now
completely controlled by the Democrats.
President Reagan's inability to capture the legislature meant that
many of his reforms could not get the exposure he desired. Public
outcry was nominal, and the conflict between the President and a
"preservationist Court," as in the New Deal era, never materialized.81
Also, while voter turnout improved in 1984 compared with 1982, it
merely returned to the turnout levels during the 1976 and 1980
271. Id. at 377.
272. Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 9, at 390; Mark Tushnet, Living in a
Constitutional Moment?: Lopez and Constitutional Theory, 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev.
845, 848 (1996).
273. Christopher H. Schroeder, Causes of the Recent Turn in Constitutional
Interpretation,51 Duke L.J. 307, 339 (2001).
274. See id.
275. Rusk, supra note 2, at 216, 377.
276. Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 9, at 391; Tushnet, supra note 272, at
846.
277. National Voter Turnout in Federal Elections: 1960-2000, available at
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0781453.html [hereinafter Nat'l Voter Turnout].
"Eligible adults" refers to all U.S. citizens who are able to register to vote, while
"registered voters" refers to the population that actually did register to vote. The
percentage of registered voters needs to be independently calculated.
278. Rusk, supra note 2, at 132, 168.
279. Id. at 216, 377.
280. Id.
281. Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 9, at 391.
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compared to
presidential elections.282 This was despite the fact that,
283
1980, an additional six million voters came to the polls.
President Reagan's inability to capture Congress for the Republican
party does not demonstrate that Reagan's election failed to change
the government. The direction of politics in the country definitely
Through Supreme Court appointments, Reagan was
changed. 2'
successful in ensuring the longevity of his ideology.285 The Senate
confirmed President Reagan's elevation of Justice Rehnquist to Chief
Justice and confirmed Antonin Scalia in 1986.286 During this time,
President Reagan was still extremely popular and the Republicans
had control of the Senate. 287 When Robert Bork was nominated in
1987 to succeed Justice Powell, the situation had changed.
Democrats, who had taken control of the Senate, were wary of 288a
conservative revolution led by the Supreme Court and rejected him.
Republicans, unwilling to confront the Senate Democrats and turn
Supreme Court appointments into a political issue in the 1988
campaign, backed down.289 President Reagan appointed the moderate
Anthony Kennedy, who was easily confirmed.290
2. The Gingrich Revolution
In 1992, a Democrat, William Jefferson Clinton, was elected
President. 291 However, in 1994, the Democrats lost control of both the
House and the Senate. 292 Most striking was the fifty-two seat shift in
the House, as seventy-four new Republicans were ushered into
office,293 switching control in that chamber for the first time since
2 95 who became
1955.294 Led by the Republican Whip Newt Gingrich,
282. Nat'l Voter Turnout, supra note 277.
283. Id.
284. Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 9, at 390-92.
285. Id. at 394-95; David M. O'Brien, How the Republican War Over "Judicial
Activism" Has Cost Congress, in Congress Confronts the Court: The Struggle for
Legitimacy and Authority in Lawmaking 69, 72-73 (Colton C. Campbell & John F.
Stack, Jr. eds., 2001)[hereinafter Republican War].
286. See Yarbrough, supra note 21, at 11, 14.
287. Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 9, at 394-95. One Senator even
argued that Reagan's landslide elections in 1980 and 1984 reflected a mandate from
the People and demanded confirmation of Reagan's nominations. Yarbrough, supra
note 21, at 10-11.
288. Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 9, at 395.
289. Id.
290. Id. This contrasts with Roosevelt, who made the Court a political issue,
through one of its decisions, not one of his appointees. See supra text accompanying
notes 91-99.
291. Rusk, supra note 2, at 132.
292. Id. at 216, 377.
293. Compare 1993-1994 Official Congressional Directory: 103rd Congress 380-83
(1993) with 1995-1996 Official Congressional Directory: 104th Congress 350-52
(1995).
294. Rusk, supra note 2, at 216.
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the new Speaker of the House, the Republicans promised a new
"Contract with America," an effort to complete the revolution
President Reagan had started. 96 However, only 38.8% of adults and
57.6% of registered voters came to the polls.29 7 Compared with the
election two years before, approximately twenty-nine million fewer
people came to the polls, representing roughly a 20% drop in voters. 98
Compared with the midterm election four years before, seven million
more people came to the polls in 1994, but the percentages remained
about the same.

99

However, Republican hopes died almost as quickly as they began.3"'
President Clinton was reelected in 1996 over Republican Bob Dole.
Although Clinton won less than 50% of the popular vote, he won a
plurality and 70.45% of the electoral vote.30 ' Both margins of victory
were larger than those he had in the 1992 election.3 2 The Democrats
reduced their deficit in the House from twenty-two to nineteen,3 3 as
sixteen of the Republicans that had been swept into Congress in 1994
were voted out.3"4 The Republicans did manage to gain three more
seats in the Senate.
By 2001, the Republicans had managed to take back the presidency,
by the narrowest of margins, in an outcome that has led to questions
regarding the legitimacy of the winner. 3061 In the House, the
Republican majority had diminished to a mere five-seat edge, but only
55% of the Republicans that had been swept into office in 1994
remained in office.

7

In the Senate, the Democrats regained control

by a one-seat margin when Jim Jeffords switched parties in the middle
of 2001.308
295. Representative from Georgia's Sixth District.
296. Price, supra note 6, at 223; Tushnet, supra note 272, at 846.
297. Nat'l Voter Turnout, supra note 277.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. See Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 9, at 397; Price, supra note 6, at
224-25. The reversal in fortunes in 1996 was likely another rejection, the rejection of
the "Contract with America," which was too extreme for the centrist views possessed
by a majority of the country. A negative view of Congress, stemming from the
shutdown of the government, only served to heighten this reaction. Contra Burnham,
supra note 19, at 2273 (concluding that the 1994 election was ratified in both the 1996
and 1998 elections).
301. Rusk, supra note 2, at 132.
302. Id.
303. Id. at216.
304. Compare the list of representatives in 1995-1996 Official Congressional
Directory: 104th Congress 350-52 (1995), with the list in 1997-1998 Official
Congressional Directory: 105th Congress 492-94 (1997).
305. Rusk, supra note 2, at 377.
306. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Balkin & Levinson, supra note 19, at
1045-49.
307. Compare 1995-1996 Official Congressional Directory: 104th Congress 350-52
(1995), with Congressional Yellow Book, (Vol. 27, No. 4, Winter, 2002).
308. After the election, the Senate was evenly split, with the Republican Vice-
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III. LEGITIMIZING THE NEW COMMERCE CLAUSE

Whether the Court is "ignor[ing] the constitutional achievements of
any generation of Americans," ' is not an issue that one should easily
brush aside. As the decision in Solid Waste suggested,31 Lopez and
Morrison are now firmly part of the new Commerce Clause doctrine.
Therefore, the obvious question is whether this new emerging
doctrine is legitimate. This part analyzes that question. Section A
discusses the logic of the new interpretation of the Commerce Clause
and determines whether it is really a new doctrine or whether it is
mostly based in preexisting Supreme Court jurisprudence. Section B
analyzes whether the People have issued a mandate for such change if
Lopez and Morrison are, in fact, the beginning of a new constitutional
era.
A. The Logic of the New Commerce Clause
The authority of the government exists because the People have
vested it with that authority.311 In "refining" the Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, the Court has justified its action with the rationale that
the vertical separation of powers that is Federalism must be upheld.
As Justice Kennedy wrote in Lopez, "[t]hough on the surface the idea
[of federalism] may seem counterintuitive, it was the insight of the
Framers that freedom was enhanced by the creation of two
'
Thus, to preserve liberty, the Court
governments, not one."312
believed that it was imperative to help the states defend themselves
from the encroachments of Congress.313
Justice Kennedy bolstered his argument with the need for
accountability. The People should know which government is
While
accountable whan a particular activity is at issue.314
accountability is a legitimate goal, Kennedy and the rest of the Lopez
majority failed to acknowledge the role of the political process in
achieving this accountability by constraining an overreaching

President giving the Republicans control. However, Jim Jeffords of Vermont
switched from the Republican Party to the Independent Party in the middle of 2001,
thus giving the Democrats control. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 19, at 1085-86.
309. Bruce Ackerman, A Generation of Betrayal?, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1519, 1528
(1997) [hereinafter Betrayal].
310. See supra text accompanying notes 244-51.
311. Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers For Process Federalism,46 Vill. L. Rev. 1349,
1355-57 (2001).
312. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
313. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
314. Id. at 576-77 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Interestingly enough, Kennedy cites
as authority for this proposition the opinion of the Court in FTC v. Ticor Title Ins.
Co., 504 U.S. 621, 636 (1992), which he authored on behalf of the Court. It is unclear
in that case where he "discovered" this "truism."
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legislature.3 15 Instead, the majority vested this role of accountablilty
solely within the power of the Court.
The use of the political process was at the center of Justice
316 This
Brennan's dissent in Usery, and the Court's opinion in Garcia.
philosophy extends back to original understandings. Chief Justice
John Marshall declared that "[tihe wisdom and the discretion of
Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their
constituents possess at elections, are.... the sole restraints on which
[the people] have relied, to secure them from [congressional]
abuse. 31 7 The Court, according to Marshall, must not interfere with
the will of the People.318 This also conforms with Madison's comment
in The Federalist,Number 46:
The adversaries of the Constitution seem to have lost sight of the
people altogether.., and to have viewed [the Federal and state
governments] not only as mutual rivals and enemies, but as
uncontrolled by any common superior in their efforts to usurp the
authorities of each other.

If... the people should in [the] future become more partial to the
federal than to the State governments.., the people ought not
surely to be precluded from giving most of their confidence where
they may discover it to be most due... 319
The intent of the framers was to ensure that liberty was protected.
The liberty of the individual must be balanced with the demands of
organized society to have the effect that Madison's words intended.32
As the Court stated in New York v. United States,"' "[t]he
Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of states for the benefit
of the states or state governments .... To the contrary, the
Constitution divides authority between federal and state governments
32
for the protection of individuals.""
If the Court no longer defers to the Congress and its legislative

315. Noonan, supra note 22, at 134. "In this dynamic world, the interests of the
states were not meant to be preserved by the courts, but by politics .... It was the
structure of the Federal government, where representation in Congress was state by
state, that set a political limit on what Congress did." See also Yarbrough, supra note
21, at 107.
316. See supra text accompanying notes 191-93, 197.
317. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824).
318. This is simply a tautology based on the previous statement. If the people are
to be the sole check, then the Court has no role to play.
319. The Federalist No. 46, supra note 147, at 262-63 (James Madison).
320. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (using
same terminology in describing the Court's due process decisions and the Court's
relationship to the living tradition of the Nation).
321. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
322. Id. at 181.
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findings,323 then, a fortiori, the Court is no longer respecting the
political process and the People.3 24 For this reason, Justice Kennedy's
recent warning that "we must be very careful to preserve the role of
the Court" is alarming.32 5 While it is true that the Court is the final
authority on the Constitution, that the other branches lack an ability
to interpret the document is not a natural corollary.3 26 The political
process ensures that if legislators do not perform according to popular
expectations, they do not remain in power for long.3 27 Thus, Supreme
Court decisions that question the authority of Congress and the
democratic process in general need to be rare, occurring when the
People are impeded from using the political process. When judicial
intervention is necessary, compelling reasoning must support the
decision.3 28 The Court maintains legitimacy through its decisions and
at no time is this more important than when it is overturning a
decision of another branch of government.329
Underscoring this argument is the fact that the Violence Against
Women Act received support in Congress from thirty-eight states, and
thirty-six state Attorneys General signed a brief for its defense in
court.330 By prohibiting Congress from creating a civil rights statute
such as VAWA, the Court essentially ignored the opinion of the vast
majority of the states, while at the same time alleging that its opinion
was crucial in standing up for the interests of the states.33'
Throughout the recent Commerce Clause cases, it is interesting to
note that "[e]ven the Rehnquist Court accepts the foundational status
of [the New Deal]. 332 It is astonishing that the Court is able to
completely change Commerce Clause jurisprudence at the same time
that it is insisting that nothing has changed.333 The Court's reluctance
323. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614-16 (2000).
324. Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term: Foreword: We The Court,
115 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 129 (2001).
325. Id. at 137 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument, Bush v. Palm Beach County
Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (No. 00-836).
326. Marci Hamilton, Why Federalism Must Be Enforced: A Response to Professor
Kramer, 46 Vill. L. Rev. 1069, 1086 (2001). "James Madison explained that 'it is
incontrovertibly of as much importance to [the House of Representatives] as to any
other [branch of government], that the [C]onstitution should be preserved entire. It is
our duty."' Id. (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997) (citing 1
Annals of Cong. 500 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789))).
327. See Hamilton, supra note 326, at 1086; see generally The Federalist No. 49
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
328. See Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and PoliticalInstability,
84 Va. L. Rev. 83, 95-96 (1998).
329. Id. at 96-98.
330. Noonan, supra note 22, at 134-35.
331. Id. at 135.
332. Ackerman, Revolution, supra note 35, at 2337.
333. See supra text accompanying notes 229; Noonan, supra note 22, at 75.
"History is a powerful force ....If you grasp its direction, it will carry you with it.
Then there are those who try to hitch a lift with history but whose destination is not
where history is going. The Supreme Court seems to me like such a hitchhiker." Id.
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to admit that there has been an interpretative change is evidence of
how much the "switch in time" is entrenched in the constitutional
doctrine. Such tactics did not go unnoticed, however, and Justice
Souter warned in his dissent that the ruling "portend[s] a return to the
untenable jurisprudence from which the Court extricated itself almost
'
60 years ago."334
Professor Price notes,
On a cynical level, one is reminded of Machiavelli's assertion that, in
altering the law, one must "retain the semblance of the old forms; so
that it may seem to the people that there has been no change in the
institutions,335even though in fact they are entirely different from the
old ones."

Only if the majority was changing the rules of the game without a
mandate from the People,336 would it have to desperately convince the
People that the rules of the game had not changed.
Applying Ackerman's ten-year test 337 to these recent Commerce
Clause cases reveals that the Court has ushered in a revolutionary
change in doctrine. The current interpretation of the Commerce
Clause was completely unforseen ten years ago. One author noted
that "nothing in the Court's opinions prior to Lopez pointed to the
specific distinction the Court has erected to police those Commerce
Clause boundaries. ' 338 Also, other federalism cases, specifically those
dealing with state sovereignty issues, would have been equally difficult
to predict a decade ago. 339 Ackerman himself has expressed his belief
that the recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence is revolutionary
43
according to his definition. 11
There are scholars, however, who contest the revolutionary nature
of the new Commerce Clause. Supporters of this argument focus on
the strategic appointments by Republican presidents and the
conservatives who worked hard at creating the necessary conditions to
334. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 608 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).
335. Price, supra note 6, at 204 (quoting Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince & The
Discourses 182 (Random House 1940)).
336. Justice Thomas explicitly urged the Court to return to the more restricted
view of the Commerce Clause that existed before the "switch." Lopez, 514 U.S. at
590-93 (Thomas, J., concurring). In urging the return to Founding values, Justice
Thomas essentially denies that fundamental values in the country have changed. See
generally Ackerman, Revolution, supra note 35, at 2313.
337. See supra text accompanying note 35.
338. Schroeder, supra note 273, at 318.
339. Id. at 317-18; see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996) (overruling
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)). It would be almost impossible to
consider that the reversal of a decision just rendered is within a plausible evolutionary
envelope. Schroeder, supra note 273, at 317 n.59; see also Keith E. Whittington,
Taking What They Give Us: Explaining the Court's Federalism Offensive, 51 Duke L.
J. 477, 487 (2001).
340. Schroeder, supra note 273, at 319 (citing E-mail from Bruce Ackerman,
Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School, to Christopher H.
Schroeder, Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law (Aug. 24, 2001) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal)).
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achieve the ongoing change.341 The argument falls short of proving
that these recent decisions are not revolutionary. The "switch in
time" was also preceded by four years of President Roosevelt and the
New Deal Democrats pushing their agenda and pressuring the Court
to confirm,342 yet Roosevelt's actions did not make the eventual switch
by the Court any less revolutionary than it was. The switch was still a
major change in the Court's jurisprudence. Likewise, the actions of
the conservatives during the Reagan years do not signify that the
current change in jurisprudence is not revolutionary. If one of the
requirements of Ackerman's ten-year test was that the change would
qualify as a moment only if there were no external forces pushing for
the change, then there would never exist any moment that would
satisfy the test.
B. A New PopularMandate?
Ackerman's theory dictates that this modern switch could only
happen if the People issued a mandate. If the People gave Congress
the prominence that it enjoyed during the previous six decades, then
only the People can rightfully take it away.343 If the People believed
that Congress was in a better position to protect liberties, then only
the People could decide that Congress had failed and transfer this
power back to the states.
So, does it follow that we are now in the midst of another
constitutional moment? If not, how are we to account for the current
revolutionary behavior of the Supreme Court?
A mandate, like that issued by the People in the 1936 election,344 by
definition, must be clear and convincing, so as to leave no doubt, even
in the minds of the opposition. In the aftermath of the election of
1936, the only disagreement between the parties was how to change
345
the constitutional landscape, not whether such a change was needed.
Likewise, a mandate of today, "reflected in calls and letters to federal
representatives, daily tracking polls and the like," must represent a
united electorate with a common goal.346 According to Ackerman,
without such a mobilization, change of a constitutional magnitude
should not occur.3 47 The question remains whether either the Reagan
revolution of 1980 or the Gingrich revolution of 1994 represent such a
mandate from the People.

341. See id. at 318-19 (citing Charles Fried, Order and Law: Arguing the Reagan
Revolution-A Firsthand Account 182-88 (1991)).
342. See supra text accompanying notes 63-99.
343. See supra text accompanying notes 37-43.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 128-40.
345. See supra text accompanying notes 141-46.
346. Young, supra note 311, at 1356.
347. Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 9, at 4.
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President Reagan's election in 1980 was definitely a signal very
similar to the one that President Roosevelt received in 1932.
Likewise, it was unclear whether the People stood firmly behind
President Reagan's ideals or whether his election was a mere rejection
of President Carter. The election further mirrored Roosevelt's
election in 1932 in that approximately five million more voters came
to the polls in 1980 than in 1976.348 However, unlike the 1932 election,
the percentage of voter turnout as a fraction of both the adult
population and the registered voter population remained
349
unchanged.
President Reagan's similarities with President Roosevelt end here.
The 1982 midterm election, especially when juxtaposed against
President Roosevelt's successes in 1934,350 illustrates President
Reagan's failure to build momentum for his vision of a new America.
The Democratic victories in 1982 diminished whatever leverage
President Reagan's 1980 election had given him.
The Reagan era was a revolution that never gained the same
momentum that the New Deal had captured.35 1 While President
Roosevelt was able to get his legislative agenda passed and then back
it up with his appointments to the Court,35 President Reagan, on the
other hand, suffered setbacks in getting his legislative agenda
approved. Much of President Reagan's success and legacy stems from
the continued impact of his ideology expressed through his Supreme
Court appointments.
President George H. W. Bush, continued the attempt to influence
politics through Court appointments. While President Bush was
never able to continue with the gusto of the Reagan revolution, he did
manage to push the nomination of Clarence Thomas through the
Democrat-controlled Senate.353 On the Court today, Justice Thomas
continues to speak, with Justice Antonin Scalia, a Reagan appointee,
for many of the principles that comprised the Reagan revolution.354
President George H. W. Bush's unsuccessful attempt at reelection
marked the end of a revolution that never really fulfilled its own
348. Nat'l Voter Turnout, supra note 277.
349. Id. In 1976, 53.6% of the voting age population and 77.6% of registered
voters came to the polls. In 1980, the percentages were 52.6% and 76.5%,
respectively.
350. Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 9, at 390-92.
351. Id. at 390-92, 395.
352. Id. at 391-93.
353. Id. at 396-97.
354. See David M. O'Brien, Storm Center: The Supreme Court in American
Politics 52-53 (5th ed. 2000); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627
(2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (urging a return to "original understanding" for
Commerce Clause jurisprudence); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 936-39 (1997)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (same); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
240-41 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that the government may not make
any distinctions based on race).
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promises. However, the midterm election of 1994 brought another
signal.355 Many people, especially the overwhelming number of new
Republicans entering the House and the Senate, treated the outcome
as a reaffirmation of the ideals of the Reagan revolution. 6
Interestingly, on the same day as the election, the Supreme Court
heard oral arguments in Lopez.357 One explanation of the decision is
that the Court decided to align itself with what it thought the People
were signaling with their vote.35 s The Court decided to participate
actively in the movement and took a first step in reducing the scope of
the national government. 9 If the Court was actively participating in
pushing forward the constitutional change, there is an alarming
contrast with the original New Deal Court, which did not align itself
with the majority of Washington until after the third consecutive
election that overwhelmingly supported President Roosevelt and the
New Deal.
An explanation for the 1994 landslide election is that President
Clinton misread his electoral victory as a mandate for his party's
ideas. The same can be said of Newt Gingrich and the Republican
party. The 1996 reelection of Clinton and the minimal change in
Congress reflected the failure to carry the "Republican Revolution"
beyond a single election cycle. The voters seemed merely to be
rejecting the ideas of the one party, rather than affirming the ideology
of the other.3 6' As Ackerman remarks, the problem was that
"American revolutionaries cannot rightly hope for instant
gratification. . . .To the contrary, our constitutional system rightly
requires them to endure a decade-long period of rigorous institutional
testing before they can legitimately claim to revolutionize governing
values in the name of We the People. 361
The failure of the
Republicans to maintain the high level of support that they received in
the 1994 election illustrates, when contrasted with the affirmation of
the New Deal and President Roosevelt in the elections of the mid1930s, that the Contract with America was not something that the
People had mandated. Otherwise, such a mandate would have swept
Bob Dole into the Presidency in 1996, and would have increased
Republican membership in both houses of Congress.
The election of 2000 was fitting in that the lack of a clear winner
prevented George W. Bush from declaring a mandate, thereby
making the same mistake that Gingrich had made in 1994. As if to
355. Tushnet, supra note 272, at 848.
356. Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 9, at 397; see Tushnet, supra note 272,
at 849.
357. Price, supra note 6, at 223-24.
358. Tushnet, supra note 272, at 850-51.
359. Id.
360. See Ackerman, Revolution, supra note 35, at 2341-42; Tushnet, supra note 272,
at 848-49.
361. Ackerman, Revolution, supra note 35, at 2343.
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emphasize the lack of a mandate, the switching of parties by Senator
Jim Jeffords gave the Democrats a one-seat edge in the Senate, thus
creating a check on the presidential appointment power, and
reflecting the mood of an evenly divided country. Without Jefford's
switch, a Republican Senate would have had the ability to confirm the
appointments of a narrowly elected President, thereby giving the
President a free hand in sculpting the future of the Supreme Court.
The problem with a president unchecked by the Senate is that the
2000 election produced no mandate. Bush could have pushed through
conservative justices at a time when the country was evenly divided.
As we approach the next mid-term election, the future is unclear.
While the President has astronomical approval ratings,6 2 they are
directly related to the war on terrorism and may begin to slide as the
focus of the American public shifts back to the domestic front.3 63 The
effect that the war on terrorism and the slow economy will have on
the Congressional elections will no doubt determine whether the
Republicans increase their lead in the House and take back the
Senate.364 A Senate under Republican control will give the President
the ability to appoint future Supreme Court justices. In doing so, the
Court may push forward its own transformative agenda that, absent a
popular mandate, would be illegitimate. "The powers of the several
branches of government are defined, and the excess of them ... find[]
limits, which cannot be transgressed without offending against that
greater power from who all authority, among us, is derived; to wit, the
people."365
CONCLUSION

We are in the midst of a "revolution by stealth. 366 Constitutional
principles that have guided this country for the past sixty years are
362. Jeffrey M. Jones, Bush's Most Recent Quarterly Approval Average Among
Five Best The Gallup Organization
(Apr.
18, 2002), available at
http://www.gallup.com/ poll/releases/pr020418.asp.
363. Id. Interestingly, in early February 2001, President Bush's approval rating was
at 57%, compared with a 25% disapproval rating. The gap closed in the months
preceding September 11, so that in early September, he had a 51% approval rating
and a 39% disapproval rating. Immediately after the attack on September 11, his
approval rating jumped to 86%, peaking at 90% the following week. In contrast,
President Bush's disapproval ratings were 10% and 6% respectively. Since then, the
numbers have slowly returned, with a poll in early April producing a 75% approval
rating and a 20% disapproval rating. Id.
364. See generally Lydia Saad, Democrats Gain Upper Hand in Gallup Test
Election for Congress The Gallup Organization (Apr. 11, 2002), available at
http://www.gallup. com/poll/releases/pr020411.asp.
365. Kramer, supra note 324, at 11 (quoting St. George Tucker, On Sovereignty and
Legislature, in Blackstone's Commentaries app. A, reprinted in St. George Tucker,
View of the Constitution of the United States with Selected Writings 18, 19 (Liberty
Fund 1999) (1803)).
366. Nicol C. Rae, When Do Courts "Legislate"?: Reflections on Congress and the
Court, in Congress Confronts the Court: The Struggle for Legitimacy and Authority

2002]

CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION

eroding. This time, however, the transformation is occurring without
a mandate from the People. Scholars who have asserted this
conclusion before have used it as a launching pad from which to
attack the flaws in Ackerman's model.367 The argument goes like this:
If this is a constitutional moment and there is no popular mandate,
then Ackerman's model must be wrong.
There is an alternative. The current transformation represents an
illegitimate usurpation of power by the Supreme Court. While a
majority on the Court may desire to set policy in a certain direction,
the will of the People, reflected through Congress and the President,
must not be ignored. There is a difference between deciding what the
law is and what the law should be, and currently the Supreme Court is
stuck on the latter track.
Intent on pushing its own agenda, the Supreme Court has continued
to alter six decades of constitutional interpretation Moreover, the
Supreme Court has restricted the powers of the other two branches of
government and, by extension, the will of the People. The Court is
chipping away at the legitimacy of the expanded powers of the
national government that have shaped our country since the New
Deal.36 s It is changing the interpretation of the Commerce Clause and
the balance of power between the federal and state governments,36 9
establishing that the Constitution conferred upon the states an
affirmative grant of power, thereby limiting the reach of the
Commerce Clause.37 °
According to Bruce Ackerman, major constitutional change can
only occur with a mandate from the People. The signing of the

Constitution and the adoption of the Bill of Rights, and the
in Lawmaking 111, 115 (Colton C. Campbell & John F. Stack, Jr. eds., 2001).
367. See, e.g., Schroeder, supra note 273, at 322; Whittington, supra note 339, at
493-94.
368. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 19, at 1052-61; Burnham, supra note 19, at
2273; Price, supra note 6, at 220-21. Over the six decades since the New Deal, the
Court found more activities to have an effect on interstate commerce, despite
increasing tenuous connections. For example, in Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146
(1971), the Court held that even though loan sharking at the local level was purely
intrastate, it affected interstate commerce and thus fell under the jurisdiction of the
Commerce Clause. Similarly, in Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969), the Court held
that simply because a local county amusement park in the middle of Alabama had
brought in from out of state some food, paddleboats and a jukebox, it had an effect on
commerce.
369. See Burnham, supra note 19, at 1073; Price, supra note 6, at 220-21. The
change in interpretation was in direct response to the changing nature of the
American economy. See Price, supra note 6, at 203.
370. Unites States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995); id. at 574-78 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); Yarbrough, supra note 21, at 114; Stack & Campbell, supra note 21, at
102-04; see also Rossum, supra note 21, at 249-50 (using similar reasoning to that used
three years earlier in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992)). The
Tenth Amendment states that, "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." U.S. Const. amend. X.
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subsequent adoption of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments after the Civil War, were all examples of such major
constitutional change. The New Deal and, more importantly, its
eventual acceptance by the Supreme Court, constituted another major
shift in constitutional jurisprudence, changing the federal system by
allowing the substantial growth of federal power. While such a
mandate existed in the mid-1930s, the same is not true today. This
modern revolution comes not from the People, but from the Court
itself.
Today's political environment has only made this transformation
easier for the Court to achieve. The other two branches have become
increasingly weak throughout the past decade, with gridlock ensuring
that little is even accomplished. As Robert Dahl noted, the Court is
"most likely to succeed against a 'weak' majority; e.g., a dead one, a
transient one, a fragile one, or one weakly united upon a policy of
'
subordinate importance."371
It is no surprise that in modern politics,
where partisan disputes are commonplace, the Court is having an
easier time exerting its own will over that of the People.
Assuming Ackerman is correct that the People drive change
through mandates, they should be protesting the change that is
occurring without their approval. The People are not reacting,
however, for three main reasons. First, the Court's intrusion has been
in areas of little general concern. While some constitutional theorists
may have become alarmed, the same cannot be said of the average
American. Second, the average American pays little attention to the
Court. The Court's decisions do not affect them directly and the
opinions themselves are not always clear. The media is unwilling to
take the time to explain decisions that exceedingly few people are
interested in, notwithstanding the People's ability to understand those
decisions. The lack of media coverage only heightens this problem,
creating a self-perpetuating cycle of ignorance. Highlighting this point
is a survey that "found that only 12.8% of the American public was
aware of even major Court decisions, accepted constitutional
interpretation as a proper role for the Court, and regarded the Court
as carrying out its responsibilities in an impartial and competent
manner."37 2 Third, the average American is not very concerned with
government in general. The exponential growth of the administrative
state is a small part of the reason. The actions of the government have
become increasingly difficult to follow, and the media, with its
371. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a
National Policy-Maker,50 Emory L.J. 563, 571 (2001), honorary reprint from 6 J. Pub.
L. 279 (1957).
372. Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Road Taken: Robert A. Dahl's Decision-Making in
a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy Maker, 50 Emory L. Rev. 613,
629 (2001) (quoting Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Public Opinion and the
Supreme Court: A Preliminary Mapping of Some Prerequisitesfor Court Legitimation
of Regime Change, 2 L. & Soc'y Rev. 357, 359, 377-78 (1968)).
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obsession with flashy headlines and sound bites, only exacerbates the
problem.
Therefore, the Court must regain its faith in the safeguards inherent
in the American political process and, in doing so, acknowledge that
the ultimate safeguard is the American People.
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